The U.S. more than doubled its number of troops in Syria — from 900 to around 2,000 — before the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s government, the Pentagon said Thursday, publicly disclosing the surge for the first time.
In a rare step, Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder opened the regular Thursday briefing at the Pentagon with the admission.
“I learned today that, in fact, there are approximately 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria,” he said.
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Ryder had previously told reporters that there were 900 such forces in the country as part of America’s decade-old fight against the Islamic State group. These troops are deployed for nine to 12 months at a time, he said Thursday, as opposed to the 1,100 extra forces who are being surged for a shorter window of 30 to 90 days.
Ryder could not share where the troops came from, what units are involved or their specific mission — other than it concerns the mission against ISIS and that most of the troops are from the Army.
Pentagon spokespeople were scrambling Thursday to answer further questions from reporters, including where the troops are operating and how it’s possible so many extra forces are in the country without their knowledge.
“I’m confident that the secretary is tracking U.S. forces deployed around the world,” Ryder said. “There oftentimes are going to be diplomatic or operational security considerations as it relates to the deployment of forces,” and whether they’re made public, he said.
Ryder said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin did not order the surge of troops to be kept private. Ryder also did not directly respond to a question about whether any part of the Defense Department attempted to conceal the information, since the Pentagon has publicly said the number of troops in the country is 900 for years.
He said Austin and Gen. Erik Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, have not discussed the issue despite the two speaking often.
Late last month, Syria’s ruling Assad regime fell after 50 years in power, when rebels stormed the capital of Damascus following a rapid offensive. The U.S. and Israel have since been pounding the country with airstrikes, hitting targets that were once off-limits due to the regime or Russian forces operating in the area.
U.S. Central Command conducted two large strikes in the last two weeks, the crescendo to a rising campaign against ISIS that’s involved more raids in Syria and Iraq over the last several months.
The extra forces were inside Syria before the regime fell, Ryder said.
Meanwhile, President-elect Donald Trump has publicly called for the U.S. not to get further involved in the country. During his first presidency, Trump tried to withdraw American forces from the country, leading his first defense secretary to resign.
Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.
Adversaries of the United States have ramped up partnerships, both in combat and influence operations, in ways that may require the unique intervention abilities of the special operations community to avoid conflict.
Christopher Maier, the outgoing assistant secretary for Special Operations-Low-Intensity Conflict, said today at a Center for a New American Security event that SOF troops have recently increased work in the competition and crisis phases that often precede an armed conflict.
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“Progress in recent years has been expanding that aperture to look at competition and crisis as warfighting challenges as opposed to what was often the case in an exercise or tabletop, where we … fast-forward through [and say], ‘A bunch of things happen, there were some diplomatic things, a little bit of SOF things and that’s war,’” Maier said.
Furthering that sentiment, Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, head of Special Operations Command, highlighted the “convergence” of adversaries in multiple geographic regions during a Dec. 7 discussion at the Reagan National Defense Forum.
In the public sphere, these unions have taken shape in the form of more than 12,000 North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine, or Iranian military personnel training Russian troops on munitions the Middle Eastern nation has supplied to Moscow.
“This is not just Russia fighting Ukraine,” Fenton said. “It’s Russia, backed by Iranian drones, North Korean personnel and indirect Chinese contributions.”
Additionally, nation-state adversaries are teaming with non-state actors to achieve goals. That’s been the case for decades between Iran and militias like Hamas and Hezbollah. It’s also true for the Iranians and the Houthis, who have continued to fire on U.S. and civilian ships in the Red Sea over the past year.
“We’re in a decisive decade,” Fenton said. “The convergence of threats demands a convergence of our own capabilities.”
Military Times reported in 2023 on a West Virginia Army National Guard exercise that brought together personnel from all military branches, local law enforcement, government officials and SOF personnel.
The “Ridge Runner” exercise sought to drop participants into a scenario that would mirror what such forces might face in a European theater now. In some ways, it looked a lot like what forces in Ukraine have encountered since Russia invaded the country in 2022.
The SOF personnel involved in the exercise — mostly Army Green Berets — connected local forces with U.S. military capabilities and other government services as their counterparts in the field assisted those local elements in a simulated fight against an “invading force.”
That exercise is indicative of the larger shift in irregular warfare, a practice that has been given a host of labels in recent decades — “gray zone” conflicts, for example. The Pentagon adopted and redefined the term following a shift in the National Defense Strategy to focus military efforts on countering adversaries rather than counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
Combinations of psychological operations, civil affairs and special operations personnel now work closely in smaller teams to assist allies in competing with and deterring Russia, China and Iran in their respective areas.
Deterrence is where much of the SOF work will take place in the years ahead, Maier added. And that, he said, will involve SOF “campaigning,” which has not traditionally been the role of the 70,000-strong U.S. special operations community.
A 2023 CNAS report by Becca Waser, a senior fellow in the CNAS Defense program who served as the moderator at the Dec. 18 event, outlined how the think tank’s experts see SOF and conventional forces evolving.
The campaigning approach links civil government resources with military assets and personnel to respond to challenges from Russia or China, or other events that require military action, such as regional conflicts or natural disasters, according to the report.
The CNAS report advises the Pentagon to develop a more tailored campaigning approach specific to the geographical region where forces are operating.
That gives U.S. planners the chance to build military forces in key areas of the Indo-Pacific and Europe. It also lets military forces showcase new capabilities, weapons and tactics to discourage adversaries from initiating conflict.
Lastly, Waser wrote that campaigning in this region-specific way allows U.S. forces to already be in the area when a crisis arises.
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
One of the Marine Corps’ newest operational formations recently fielded a crucial “workhorse” air defense system to counter enemy drones and other aerial threats.
Leathernecks with the 3rd Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment in Hawaii received the Marine Air Defense Integrated System, or MADIS, as the newly formed unit positions itself to counter threats in the Indo-Pacific region, according to a Marine Corps Systems Command release.
“The rapid rise of UAS, used for surveillance, targeting and attacks, has made advanced air defense systems like MADIS critical to protecting our Marines and preserving our combat effectiveness,” said Lt. Col. Craig Warner, Future Weapons Systems product manager. “MADIS not only detects, tracks and defeats aerial threats but also serves as a powerful deterrent, signaling to adversaries that their aerial assets will not succeed against U.S. forces.”
All services continue to face a growing drone threat in every area of operations. In 2018, the Marines responded by beginning to build capacity for a “layered defense,” one that would eventually use the MADIS, Col. Andrew Konicki told Marine Corps Times. Konicki manages the Corps’ Ground-Based Air Defense program office.
Marine officials have called the MADIS, built by Kongsberg Protech Systems USA, the “basic building block of the LAAD battalions’ ground base air defense capability.”
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For non-air defenders, MADIS allows Marines to focus on their mission instead of the sky, giving Marines one major threat they no longer have to worry about.
“MADIS creates its own [anti-access, area-denial] bubble,” Warner said.
The system replaces a cumbersome legacy platform Marines have long used to defend the skies. The Man-Portable Air Defense System, or MANPADs, includes a fire unit vehicle, section leader vehicle and the Stinger shoulder-fired missile as its primary weapon system, according to the Marine Corps.
Some version of that platform has been in place since the Army and Marine Corps first developed anti-aircraft protection measures against fast-moving aircraft in the 1950s.
MADIS, meanwhile, removes the need for a Marine to ever exit their vehicle, manually sight in and destroy an enemy aircraft.
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle-mounted MADIS allows users to track and detect both friendly and enemy aircraft and select kinetic options, such as missiles or gunfire, and non-kinetic options, such as signal jammers or lasers, before disabling the threat.
The MADIS, which uses two JLTVs, includes multiple systems, such as radar, surface-to-air missiles and command and control elements. Each vehicle complements the other.
“In layman’s terms, one detects, and the other attacks,” according to a Marine release.
The new unit fielding the MADIS, the Hawaii-based 3rd MLR, is the Corps’ first operational littoral regiment. The service seeks to establish two additional regiments in the Pacific, with the 12th MLR slated for Okinawa, Japan, and the 4th MLR planned for Guam.
The new regiments are a slimmed down version — about 1,800 to 2,000 Marines — of the traditional infantry regiment, with missiles instead of conventional artillery, their own landing craft, anti-air battalions and other features purpose-designed for littoral combat. A conventional Marine infantry regiment can contain up to 2,200 Marines.
A light version of the MADIS, aptly named the L-MADIS, saw its operational debut in July 2019, when Marines aboard the amphibious assault ship Boxer used the system, mounted on a Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicle, to shoot down an Iranian drone, Marine Corps Times previously reported.
Marines with 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, watch for nearby drones using a Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System. (Lance Cpl. Micah Thompson/Marine Corps)
The light version is “uniquely aligned” to the Marine Expeditionary Units, smaller than an MLR with a broader range of missions. The MADIS can handle the air defense needs of larger formations and can synchronize and coordinate with the L-MADIS, Konicki said.
The Corps’ Fiscal Year 2024 budget request included $130 million for 13 MADIS Increment 1 systems.
In 2022, the Marines held an industry day to develop capabilities for the next version of MADIS to defeat larger drones.
“Fielding MADIS to [3rd] LAAB is only the first step,” Konicki said. “What MADIS is today will not be the same system 12, 24, 36 months from now.
Beyond continued upgrades to software, power consumption and capabilities for the system, Marine officials released a request from industry for proposals on a smaller, dismounted version of the MADIS capability earlier this year, Konicki added.
System fielding by the LAAD battalion will begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025, according to the release.
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
Three U.S. combatant commands and the Defense Department’s IT support agency failed to follow cybersecurity protocols when handling classified mobile devices, according to a Defense Department Office of the Inspector General report released Monday.
The heavily redacted report, titled the “Audit of Cybersecurity of DoD Classified Mobile Devices,” said U.S. European Command, two subcomponents of U.S. Special Operations Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency didn’t maintain an accurate inventory record of devices, a misstep that could leave sensitive information vulnerable to cyber threats.
“Security for DoD mobile devices is essential for safeguarding national security, protecting classified data, and ensuring the integrity of the DoD’s missions,” Pentagon Inspector General Robert P. Storch said in a release. “Securing these devices is not merely a technical priority; it’s a critical operational mandate that enables the DoD to fulfill its mission safely and effectively.”
The audit looked at 43 devices from the Defense Information Systems Agency, 21 devices from the U.S. European Command, four devices from the U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters and five devices from the U.S. Special Operations Command Central.
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The audit found that the organizations kept incomplete device records, which should include the name and defense agency of the user, type of device, serial number of device, phone number, classification of data stored on device and the conditions for when and how the device is to be used.
Those in charge of managing and tracking the devices came up short, the report found, partly due to their inability to handle the uptick in mobile device usage after the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, an event that forced many into a telework situation.
The report also found that the inventory records for the Defense Information Systems Agency and U.S. Special Operations Commands Headquarters in some cases had the wrong information for devices.
The DOD Office of Inspector General recommended the U.S. European Command and U.S. Special Operations Command immediately fix inventory records to reflect all classified mobile devices, revamp the classified mobile device program and its training and revisit the reason for each individual’s use of a classified device to determine if they need it, among other recommendations. Both agencies complied with the recommendation, according to the report.
The audit further called for the Defense Information Systems Agency to fix its inventory records and develop a new process for keeping accurate inventories. The agency responded that it would devise a way to keep its inventory records up to date.
The report also asked the Defense Department to nudge agencies under its umbrella to follow the report’s recommendations.
The DOD Office of Inspector General has made several pushes to address cybersecurity weaknesses, releasing a special report in March highlighting weak passwords and a bucking of multifactor authentications for Defense Department contractors. The report found that between 2018 to 2023 five audits revealed DOD officials were unable to properly check whether contractors were following cybersecurity requirements.
Riley Ceder is a reporter at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice, investigations, and cyber. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the Abused by the Badge investigation.
Marines in the service’s newest fighting formation will field a more rugged and capable mobile command vehicle on one of its newest ground vehicles in January.
Under a contract with U.S defense firm Science Applications International Corporation, an initial purchase of 18 mobile command vehicles, or MCVs, will be delivered to Marine littoral regiments’ medium-range missile firing units between January and July of next year, according to a Marine Corps release.
The Corps’ current program budget has another 18 MCVs headed to the service in August through early 2026.
The MCV is platform-mounted to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, which replaces the Humvee in some Army and Marine units.
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As fixed positions on the battlefield become increasingly vulnerable, the release states, mobile systems like the MCV and JLTV are essential to maintaining an edge in the current threat environment.
The MCV combines a shelter integrated on the JLTV platform with upgraded communication capabilities and expanded access to fires command and control networks, according to the release.
Lt. Col. Joshua Faucett, product manager for fire support systems, noted the MCV’s “strategic, operational advantage” in equipping Marines with capabilities critical for a future fight.
“The MCV is a prime example of how we are adapting to meet the needs of the modern battlefield and we’re receiving deliveries less than six months after award — that’s a testament to the hard work of our acquisition team and industry partners,” Faucett said.
Elsewhere in the Corps, personnel at the Marine Depot Maintenance Command production plant at Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia, conducted the service’s first organic rebuild of a JLTV engine at a Defense Department depot, according to a release.
The modified Duramax 6.6-liter diesel engine has specialized components and a proprietary engine control module specifically designed for combat conditions.
However, those features also make testing and repairing vehicles more challenging.
Experts noticed earlier this year that the vehicle was burning through engines faster than they’d planned. But the Army, as the main buyer of JLTVs, controls the new engine inventory. And the Marines must pay about $61,000 for each.
“The hardest part wasn’t rebuilding the engine itself — it was communicating with the computer,” said Jim Dupree, a heavy mobile equipment mechanic at the depot. “Once we cracked that, everything else fell into place.”
By rebuilding worn engines in-house, the depot could save as much as $40,000 per unit.
The new ability also lets the Corps remain ‘Semper Gumby,’ or Always Flexible, by having another supply line.
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
The Army and Navy on Thursday completed a successful all-up round test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, potentially paving the way for the services to begin fielding the long-awaited system.
The glide body was developed jointly between the two services. The Army plans to integrate its version of the system, the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, into a mobile ground platform. The Navy will integrate its version, dubbed Conventional Prompt Strike, into a ship-launched capability.
“This test builds on several flight tests in which the Common Hypersonic Glide Body achieved hypersonic speed at target distances and demonstrates that we can put this capability in the hands of the warfighter,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said in a Pentagon statement.
The launch took place at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida. The Defense Department did not offer further details about the event, which represents the glide body’s second successful all-up round test this year.
Hypersonic systems can fly and maneuver at five times the speed of sound — and the Pentagon has been trying to field them for decades. The Army had planned to make a LRHW fielding decision by the end of fiscal 2023, but delayed that milestone after several aborted tests last year. The service now plans to make a fielding decision next year.
Doug Bush, the Army’s acquisition executive, told reporters this earlier this year that the all-up round test is critical to making sure the system is “safe and effective” and ready to field.
The Navy, meanwhile, plans to start fielding Conventional Prompt Strike on its Zumwalt-class destroyer in FY25 and its Virginia-class submarine in FY29.
Leidos is the prime contractor for the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, and Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for both LRHW and the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program.
Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.
NEW YORK — Woody Allen’s former personal chef claims in a lawsuit that the filmmaker and his wife fired him because of his service in the U.S. Army Reserve and questions about his pay, then “rubbed salt on the wounds” by saying they didn’t like his cooking.
Allen and Soon-Yi Previn “simply decided that a military professional who wanted to be paid fairly was not a good fit to work in the Allen home,” private chef Hermie Fajardo said in a civil complaint filed Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan.
Allen and Previn knew Fajardo would need time off for military training exercises when they and their home manager hired him as their full-time chef in June 2024 at an annual salary of $85,000, the complaint said. But he was fired the following month, soon after returning from a training that lasted a day longer than expected, it said.
When Fajardo returned to work, “he was immediately met with instant hostility and obvious resentment by defendants,” according to the lengthy complaint.
At the time, Fajardo had been raising concerns about his pay — first that his employers weren’t properly withholding taxes or providing a paystub, then that they shortchanged him by $300, according to the complaint.
Allen, Previn and manager Pamela Steigmeyer are accused in the lawsuit of violating the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and New York labor law, as well as causing Fajardo humiliation, stress and a loss of earnings.
Representatives for Allen did not immediately respond to emails seeking comment.
Fajardo said he was hired after being showered with compliments following a meal of roasted chicken, pasta, chocolate cake and apple pie he prepared for the defendants and two guests. According to the complaint, it was only after Previn fired him and he hired a lawyer that he was told his cooking was not up to par, a claim Fajardo said was untrue.
TOKYO — U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with officials in Japan on Tuesday to reaffirm the importance of their alliance and Washington’s commitment to regional security as threats rise from China and North Korea.
Austin also stressed that U.S. trilateral cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul is crucial for regional stability even as South Korea is in political turmoil following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s short-lived declaration of martial law last week.
Austin’s visit also came amid growing concerns over the safety of Osprey military aircraft, which have been grounded in the United States following a near crash at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico last month. The incident, caused by weakened metal components, was similar to a fatal crash off southwestern Japan last year.
The U.S. measure prompted Japan to also ground its Ospreys. After confirming details with the U.S. military, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force has suspended operations of its 17 Ospreys, except for possible disaster relief and other missions, beginning Tuesday to prioritize safety, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi told reporters.
During their meeting, Austin and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba noted the collapse of the Syrian government and praised the strength of the Japan-U.S. alliance at a time of rapid global political change.
“The world can change drastically in a week,” Ishiba told Austin, referring to political unrest in South Korea and Syria.
The U.S. defense chief, whose term ends in January when President-elect Donald Trump takes office, told Ishiba that he appreciated the steady alliance with Japan during “very dynamic times” and that he was proud of the modernization of alliance command and control, strengthening of force posture and deterrence capabilities over the past several years.
Austin later met with Japanese counterpart Gen Nakatani and noted China’s “coercive behavior” in the East and South China Seas and North Korean support for Russia’s war in Ukraine as growing challenges.
Austin underlined U.S. commitment “to advancing our historic trilateral cooperation” with South Korea. Washington’s commitment of “extended deterrence,” including its nuclear umbrella, to Japan and South Korea is “iron clad,” he added.
Nakatani earlier told reporters that cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as with South Korea and other partners, is important as tensions escalate in the region.
The trilateral partnership between Japan, the U.S. and South Korea has significantly strengthened under President Joe Biden’s administration, but faces new uncertainty amid ongoing political unrest in South Korea, which already led to the cancellation of Austin’s planned trip to that country.
On Monday, Austin greeted crew members of the George Washington, a nuclear-powered flagship aircraft carrier docked at the U.S. Navy base in Yokosuka, near Tokyo.
Austin stressed the importance of U.S. cooperation with allies and partners in the region as he singled out China as the only country in the world with the intent and capability to change the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific, according to the U.S. Defense Department.
“We want to see this region remain open to freedom of navigation and the ability to fly the skies in international airways,” Austin was quoted as saying on the Defense Department’s website.
“We will work with allies and partners to ensure we can do just that,” he added.
The U.S. carrier, which is under maintenance in Yokosuka, will carry the advanced F-35C stealth combat aircraft squadron currently based in the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in the southwestern Japanese prefecture of Yamaguchi.
A 52-year-old Texas man who falsely claimed to have served in the 82nd Airborne Division and the elite Army Delta Force has been sentenced to 40 years in prison for bilking dozens of people out of more than $12.7 million.
Saint Jovite Youngblood, of Manor, Texas, offered his protection from fictitious Mexican drug cartels to at least 32 victims in exchange for money, investigators found. Youngblood also told victims that the payments were like investments, and he would pay them back with a “significant return,” according to a release.
In one of his schemes, Youngblood told a victim that a Mexican drug cartel planned to kill the man and his son, adding that he could offer protection for a fee.
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Instead, Youngblood, also known as “Kota Youngblood,” took the money and gambled it during trips to Las Vegas, according to court documents.
Youngblood, meanwhile, was a used car salesman who never served in the military.
A federal jury found him guilty on four counts of wire fraud and one count of money laundering in April, Army Times previously reported.
“This fraudster developed close relationships with dozens of individuals, building an immense amount of trust seemingly just to destroy their lives financially through elaborate, deceitful misrepresentations,” U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas Jaime Esparza said in a release.
Some of his victims were fellow parents of children in a youth ice hockey league in suburban Austin, Texas.
“Many of Youngblood’s victims were terrorized thinking their families were in danger; others lost their livelihoods to his schemes,” Special Agent in Charge Aaron Tapp, of the FBI’s San Antonio Field Office, said in the release. “This sentence reflects the despicable nature of Mr. Youngblood’s lies and criminal actions.”
Youngblood often paid for dinners on sports road trips and gave parents gifts. He told fake stories of having served in the military and claimed he currently worked as an undercover federal agent.
In another incident he borrowed $200,000 from fellow hockey league parents to secure family heirlooms and resolve an alleged extortion case with his ex-wife.
As part of one scheme, Youngblood showed a victim fake documents, which he said indicated the victim was being targeted. He told them he would provide protection for a fee.
To pay his victims back, he offered to let victims hold supposedly valuable items as collateral. Items included baseball bats he said were used by Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, antique clocks and a Confederate-era flag, all of which later proved to be fake.
Youngblood said he was involved in investment opportunities with gold bars, coins, antique clocks, sports memorabilia and other items that could “generate significant returns on funds provided to him.”
At first, Youngblood did return some of the money victims provided to lull them into a false belief that their “investment” was secure, prosecutors said.
One victim, Austin-area developer Eric Perardi, told local news outlets he paid Youngblood nearly $900,000 over a period because he believed his family would be killed by cartel members.
Youngblood told him that a cartel had ordered a hit on Perardi and his son. He first asked him for $70,000 to hire people to protect them and said he’d give the money back to Perardi in a couple of weeks.
But the constant calls continued. To pay Youngblood’s protection fees Perardi sold his home and later lost his business.
Perardi later reported Youngblood to the FBI. He wore a wire to record Youngblood for federal agents.
“Justice was served,” Perardi told local media outlets after the April trial. “The FBI and the U.S. attorney believed us, put together a case really quickly, and though none of us can ever get our lives back, knowing that he can’t do this to other victims is a huge weight lifted.”
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor achieved as nearly complete a surprise on an opponent as any in military history. Ever since the first bombs fell along Battleship Row on Dec. 7, 1941, historians have pondered how that could be.
Explanations have run the gamut from the incompetence of the U.S. military commanders in Honolulu to racial hubris and on up to conspiracy among the Roosevelt administration’s innermost circle. The real answer, however, is far more reasonable.
Simply put, Admiral Husband Kimmel was caught with his pants down that day, not only because of shortcomings in U.S. radio intelligence, but also because an elaborate scheme of radio denial and deception developed by the Imperial Japanese Navy’s general staff and its Combined Fleet blinded Washington to Tokyo’s intentions to precipitate conflict.
With a great deal of foresight and planning, the imperial navy’s leadership had enacted a synchronized strategy for the attack on Pearl Harbor that combined radio silence, active radio deception and its own effective radio intelligence to be assured that the Americans remained in the dark throughout the final moments of peace.
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For two decades before 1941, the bulk of Japan’s navy typically took a defensive posture in any fleet exercises simulating a conflict with the United States and its Pacific Fleet, while allowing other smaller naval forces to attack targets elsewhere in the Pacific—usually to the south.
During the 1930s, as the navy expanded and modernized its aircraft carrier arm, its major exercises continued to feature that defensive doctrine while its commanders visualized a decisive battle against the Americans occurring farther east, near the Mariana Islands.
U.S. naval intelligence was aware of Japan’s defensive outlook and had come to accept it as absolute. The Americans believed wholeheartedly that in any future conflict the majority of Emperor Hirohito’s naval forces would choose to remain in home waters rather than run the risk of leaving Japan undefended.
In January 1941, however, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto proposed that the decades-old strategy be scrapped in favor of one calling for a first strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It was not a completely new idea, having been considered with some regularity by the popular press and war college students. What made it different was that this time the idea was coming from a senior member of the naval establishment. Someone of Yamamoto’s stature could not be ignored.
Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese combined fleet and the mastermind of the attack on Pearl Harbor. (AP)
Initially Yamamoto was rebuffed, but by the late summer of 1941 he was able to bring the navy’s general staff around to his way of thinking.
Among the changes resulting from this new direction was the organization of Japan’s carriers into a single unit. For more than a decade, the carriers had been arranged into divisions comprising two flattops and their escorts. In maneuvers, those divisions were parceled out to the various fleets to serve as escorts or scouts. Under Yamamoto’s direction, however, in April 1941 all eight of the emperor’s carriers would serve together.
This gave the Combined Fleet a permanent mobile air force of nearly 500 planes. The 1st Air Fleet was a radical departure from naval practice at that time, and was well beyond anything being considered by either the American or Royal navies.
As radical a change as it was, however, U.S. naval intelligence failed to notice. It intercepted a reference to the “1st AF” in November 1941 but was unable to discern what that meant. All intelligence officers could conclude was that the 1st AF “seemed to be in a high position” in the Japanese naval aviation hierarchy.
Yamamoto was too experienced to believe that such oversight would last for long and, as part of his new strategy, pushed for a denial-and-deception effort that would keep the change shrouded in mystery.
Communications security had been a major concern of the imperial navy as far back as the Russo-Japanese War, and it held the American and British radio intelligence offices in particularly high regard. It was for this reason that communication security was a feature of every navy exercise throughout the interwar period.
By late 1941, however, American and British radio intelligence had mixed capabilities. The countries’ code-breakers had been able to recover only about 10 percent of the code groups of the latest version of the main Japanese naval operational code, and intercepted messages often could not be understood in full. That meant the majority of American efforts were focused on direction finding (D/F) and traffic analysis — i.e., the scrutiny of Japanese naval communications, less the messages.
American ability in this area was good but subject to limitations. While one monitoring station in Cavite, Philippines, known as “Cast,” could take single-line bearings on Japanese ships and stations, the rest of the direction-finding effort was not, according to Navy cryptologist Lt. Cmdr. Joseph John Rochefort, “as efficient or productive of results as it might have been.”
The stations lacked men and equipment, and the long distances involved (more than 2,000 miles) rendered most results difficult to act upon.
U.S. traffic analysis was totally dependent on the level of Tokyo’s communications. Even then, Rochefort’s fleet communications unit in Hawaii, called “Hypo,” sometimes differed with Cavite’s analysis.
Both radio intelligence units reported their findings on a nearly daily basis — Cast’s reports were known as TESTM, while Hypo produced what was called H Chronology. The often-conflicting reports were routinely sent to Kimmel in Pearl Harbor as well as to the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D.C.
To further muddy the waters, Kimmel’s fleet intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, would compose his own daily Communications Intelligence (COMINT) summary, which was largely a synthesis of the Cast and Hypo reports.
A complete lack of human intelligence sources meant that the Americans had no way to supplement, replace or verify the conflicting reports. The almost total reliance on intercepted radio traffic meant that all the Japanese had to do to give the Americans the slip was add new levels of security to their naval communications system.
The USS Arizona Memorial is seen during a ceremony to mark the 82nd anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 2023. (Mengshin Lin/AP)
The first step was to initiate the new fleet signal system HY009 (kana-kanak-number), which was put into effect on Nov. 1, 1941. More important, five days later the imperial navy changed the way it addressed radio traffic.
Previously, messages were addressed openly to the recipient, usually with the latter’s call sign in the message transmission. The new system, however, replaced those calls with single general or collective call signs that equated to groupings such as “all ships and stations” or “all fleet elements.” The specific addresses themselves were buried in the encrypted part of the message. This simple change nearly crippled American analysis of Japanese naval messages.
The Japanese Strike Force also received supplementary instructions for its communications. Representatives from the naval general staff, 1st AF, Combined Fleet, 11th Air Fleet and other high-ranking officials were probably briefed at a conference on fleet communications in Tokyo on Oct. 27, 1941. Although records of the conference are mostly missing, we can reconstruct the major elements of the deception plan that was discussed.
The first part of the plan was to forbid communication from the Strike Force’s ships. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the Hawaiian Operation (as the Pearl Harbor attack was named), controlled his communications within the stipulations of Yamamoto’s “Secret Order Number One,” which took effect for the Strike Force on November 5.
Nagumo emphasized to the ship’s captains that “all transmissions [among Strike Force vessels] are strictly forbidden,” and to ensure that his orders were followed, he had transmitters on all of his ships disabled, secured or removed entirely.
While the ships were silent, however, it was still necessary to supply them with up-to-date intelligence, weather and orders. The naval general staff accomplished this by setting up a radio broadcast system that stressed redundant transmission schedules and multiple frequencies. The broadcast was a one-way method of transmitting messages. The recipient — in this case, the Strike Force — did not acknowledge receipt of the messages, which were simply repeated to ensure that they were received.
To further assure reception of all necessary traffic, Nagumo required every ship to monitor the broadcast. Certain vessels, such as the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, were tasked with copying every message. These were then relayed to the other ships by either semaphore flags or narrow-beam signal lamps.
The Japanese knew, however, that if the ships assigned to the Strike Force suddenly went silent it could alert the Americans. Some sort of radio traffic had to be maintained. Their solution to this problem was simple but effective.
During a Tokyo-directed communications drill that ran from Nov. 8 to 13, Hiei, the carrier Akagi and the destroyers of the 24th Division were instructed to contact Tokyo three times a day on set frequencies. Two days later, new pages of drill call signs were issued to the entire fleet — except for the stations and operators imitating the ships of the Strike Force, which continued to use the old signs.
An A6M2 Zero fighter pictured on the flight deck of the Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier Akagi around the time of the Pearl Harbor attack on Dec. 7, 1941. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
To ensure the authenticity of the old signs, the radio operators from the capital ships of the Strike Force were sent to shore at the Kure, Sasebo and Yokosuka naval bases to deliver this traffic.
These operators, whose familiar “fists” were easily identified by the Americans, were critical to the deception. The Americans would connect the known fists of the operators with direction finding on the call signs of ships such as Akagi and believe that the carriers and other ships were still in Japanese waters.
In addition, as the carriers departed the Inland Sea, aircraft from the 12th Combined Air Group arrived at the newly vacated bases. Their role in the deception was to keep up air activity and associated radio traffic with the carriers and bases as though they were just continuing the earlier training.
The final part of the plan was a radio-monitoring effort to ensure that the Americans remained unaware of the approaching threat. Tokyo tasked its radio-monitoring units with listening to American communications being sent from Pearl Harbor to confirm that their ploy was working.
The main station responsible for that was the 6th Communications Unit at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The unit copied communications from the U.S. command and ships at Pearl Harbor, paying special attention to the communications of Navy and Army patrol flights taking off from the base. Through analysis of this intercepted traffic, the Japanese were able to confirm that most of those flights were staying to the south of the island.
In the two weeks preceding its redeployment to the Kuriles, the ships and planes of the Strike Force were busy with last-minute training, supply and planning for the attack. The misleading shore-based radio traffic began on Nov. 8 and continued through the 13th. All the while, ships of the force began to rendezvous at Saeki Wan in the Oita Prefecture on northeast Kyushu.
The Americans, who were monitoring the drill, correctly reported Akagi at Sasebo in the Nov. 10 Pacific Fleet Communications Summary. Two days later, the site at Cavite reported a D/F bearing that placed Yamamoto’s flagship, the battleship Nagato, near Kure, which was very close to its actual location.
On Nov. 14, Cavite located Akagi near Sasebo. The carrier, however, had left the previous day for Kagoshima, more than 300 miles to the southeast. Meanwhile, the Pacific Fleet Communications Intelligence Summary stated that the carriers were “relatively inactive” and “in home waters” from Nov. 13 to 15, which was true.
For the next two days, all of the ships of the Strike Force assembled at Saeki Wan (Bay) or at the port of Beppu on the northeast shore of Kyushu. Only Hiei was absent. It was steaming to Yokosuka to pick up an officer from the naval general staff with detailed intelligence on Pearl Harbor. The Pacific Fleet summaries noted that the carriers were either in Kure or Sasebo, or in the area of Kyushu.
In the late afternoon of Nov. 17, after Admiral Yamamoto’s final conference with the commanders and staff of the Strike Force, the carriers Hiryu and Soryu, along with their escorts, slipped out of Saeki Wan, headed southeast out of the Bungo Strait past Okino Shima Island and then turned northeast toward Hitokappu Wan in the Kuriles. The rest of the force followed in groups of two or four ships.
View from the Soryu during the ship’s speed trials in November 1937. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
For the next few days, U.S. naval radio intelligence seemed uncertain about the activity of the carriers and their escorts.
The Nov. 16 Pacific Fleet COMINT summary placed unspecified carrier divisions in the Mandates (Marshall Islands) with the 1st Destroyer Division. The summary of Nov. 18 put other carrier divisions with the 3rd Battleship Division and the 2nd Destroyer Squadron. The same summary indicated, with reservations, that the 4th Carrier Division — Shokaku (call sign SITI4) and Zuikaku — was near Jaluit Island in the Marshalls. Cavite disagreed with this analysis.
After the Strike Force left, the imperial navy sent out orders for another communications drill to begin on Nov. 22, while an air defense drill involving the Sasebo-based 11th Air Fleet started as well. Three days earlier the carriers, battleships and destroyers of the force were ordered to maintain radio watch on high and low frequencies for specific types of “battle” and “alert” messages.
By this time, it was becoming clear to the Japanese that their deception efforts had borne fruit. The Nov. 19 COMINT summary noted that Hiei “appears today at Sasebo.” In reality, the ship was in Yokosuka on the east coast of Honshu, some several hundred miles to the northeast of Sasebo.
From Nov. 20 to 23, Nagumo’s ships rendezvoused in the Kuriles anchorage. There they received the detailed intelligence from Tokyo, and Commander Minoru Genda put the aerial squadrons through flight and tactical training sessions.
On Nov. 22, Cavite took a D/F bearing on Akagi of 28 degrees, which placed it in Sasebo. The station also took a bearing on the fleet call sign of the 1st Air Fleet commander in chief placing him in Yokosuka. The next day, Cavite reported a bearing of 30 degrees on Zuikaku, which put it in Kure. According to that day’s COMINT summary, the carriers were “relatively quiet.”
On the 24th, Cavite took another D/F bearing of 28 degrees on Akagi and now asserted that it was in Kure — this despite the fact that the station had placed the same carrier in Sasebo two days earlier.
Nevertheless, it was still in “Empire waters,” which seemed to be good enough for the Americans. The intelligence summary went so far as to establish that it had minimal information on the carriers’ whereabouts. For some reason, the summary went on to indicate that one or more carrier divisions were in the Mandates.
The next day, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence released its weekly intelligence summary that placed all Japanese carriers in either Sasebo or Kure.
On that day, Tokyo broadcast Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet Operational Order No. 5 instructing the Strike Force to depart with the “utmost secrecy” on the following day and advance to its standby point northwest of Hawaii by the evening of Dec. 3. At 0600 hours the next day, the Strike Force raised anchors and sailed into the northern Pacific.
An undamaged light cruiser steams out past the burning USS Arizona and takes to sea with the rest of the fleet during the Japanese aerial attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on Dec. 7, 1941 during World War II. (AP Photo/U.S. Navy)
U.S. radio intelligence reports illustrate the continued effectiveness of the Japanese deception measures. The commander of the 16th Naval District (Philippine Islands) noted on Nov. 25 that he could not support Hawaii’s belief that Japanese carriers were in the Mandates. His message added, however, that “our best indications are that all known 1st and 2nd Fleet carriers are still in the Kure-Sasebo area.”
Meanwhile, Rochefort’s Fleet Intelligence Unit in Hawaii reported that Kirishima was in Yokosuka and that several carriers, including those of Division 4, were near Sasebo. The unit added that Japanese carriers had been heard on a tactical frequency using their drill call signs, which indicated they were still in home waters.
Perhaps the most critical deceptive transmissions were reported on the last day of the month. Cavite heard Akagi and an unidentified Maru on a bearing of 27 degrees, seemingly putting the carrier near Sasebo. Those calls had been received from the same tactical frequency five days earlier. To Rochefort, it confirmed that some sort of exercises or maneuvers were underway.
On Dec. 1, the imperial navy changed its service (or fleet) call-sign system, leading both Rochefort and Layton to conclude that Tokyo was preparing for “active operations on a large scale.” However, no one could find any evidence of a Japanese move against Hawaii, only signs of naval movement to the south.
Layton, in his report for the day placed four carriers near Formosa and one in the Mandates. When pressed by Kimmel about the others, he said he believed they were in the Kure area refitting from previous deployments.
For the next six days, the U.S. Pacific Fleet command and the respective radio intelligence centers continued to maintain that the principal Japanese flattops were in home waters near Sasebo, Kure or in the Kyushu area and that a few light or auxiliary carriers had deployed to Formosa or the Mandates.
They continued to believe this right up to the last moment. In fact, just as the first wave of Japanese aircraft appeared over Oahu, Cavite reported that Akagi was in the Nansei Islands, south of Kyushu.
The surprise was complete, the destruction almost total.
